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JAMES RICHARD GUM, 
Defendant/Appellee. * 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals is conferred by virtue of Section 
78-2a-3 (2) (g), Utah Code Annotated. 1953. as amended. Court of 
Appeals jurisdiction [Effective January 1, 1988]. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The issues presented by this appeal: 
1. Is the Amended Decree of Divorce illegal, since legal procedures 
required by the Utah Code were not followed by the trial court, and should 
it be declared null and void and accordingly be remanded for proper 
reconsideration of those issues set forth in the original Order of the Utah 
Court of Appeals. 
2. Who legally owns the house at 5685 South 3650 West, Bennion, 
Utah, which the parties bought and rented to Jim Gum, James son, who 
still rents it and resides there, as it is held on a deed as joint tenants by 
the parties. 
Priority No. 16 
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3. Did the conduct of the trial court in ignoring the Utah Code, as 
shown in the transcript, constitute additional judicial bias and 
misconduct; and should the judge be replaced by the Utah Court of Appeals 
on remand of the case; so that it may be properly concluded. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Trial courts have considerable discretion in adjusting the financial and 
property interest of parties in a divorce, and the decision of the trial 
court is presumed valid. Ruhsam v. Ruhsam. 742 P.2d 123 (Utah App. 
1987). This presumption is overcome where the appellant shows that the 
trial court misunderstood or misapplied the law resulting in substantial 
and prejudicial error; or that the evidence clearly preponderated against 
the findings; or that such a serious inequity occurred so as to manifest a 
clear abuse of discretion. M- In determining whether an error has been 
made by the trial court, the appellate court may review both the facts and 
the law, Woodward v. Woodward. 699 P.2d 700 (Utah 1985). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The statutes relied upon by the Plaintiff are: 
Statutes 
1. Section 30-3-3, Utah Code Annotated.. (1984), as amended. 
2. Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as amended. 
3. Section 30-3-6, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as amended. 
4. Section 30-3-7, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as amended. 
5. Section 30-3-10, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as amended. 
6. Section 30-3-10.6, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as amended. 
7. Section 30-4-1, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as amended. 
8. Section 30-4-3, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as amended. 
9. Section 30-6-2, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as amended. 
10. Section 30-6-4, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as amended. 
11. Section 62A-4-502, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as amended. 
12. Section 78-2a-3 (2) (g), Utah Code Annotated. 1953. as amended. 
Court of Appeals jurisdiction [Effective January 1, 1988]. 
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United States Constitution 
13. Section 1, 14th Amendment. 
Rules 
14. Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
15. Rule 201 (d), (f), Utah Rules of Evidence. 
16. Rule 701. Utah Rules of Evidence. 
17. Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
18. Rule 901, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Cases 
19. Fletcher v. Fletcher. 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1980). 
20. Gramme v. Gramme. 587 P.2d 144 (Utah 1978). 
21. Paffel v. Paffel. 732 P.2d 96, 436 (Utah 1986). 
22. Saint v. Saint. 411 P.2d 683, 196 Kan. 330 (Kan. 1966). 
23. Gardner v. Gardner. 512 P.2d 84, 85 N.M. 324 (N.M. 1973). 
24. Fife v. Fife. 479 P.2d 560, 3 Wash.App.726 (Wash.App.1970). 
25. McCov v. McCov. 429 P.2d 999 (Okl. 1967). 
26. Countryman v. Countryman. 659 P.2d 663, 135 Ariz. 110. 
27. Christopher v. Christopher. 381 P.2d 115, 62 Wash.2d 82. 
(Wash. 1963) 
28. Brammer v. Brammer. 471 P.2d 58, 93 Idaho (Idaho 1970). 
29. Hofer v. Hofer. 427 P.2d 411, 247 Or. 82 (Or. 1967). 
30. Barrett v. Barrett. 403 P.2d 649, 17 Utah 2d1 (Utah 1965). 
31. Laws v. Laws. 432 P.2d 632, 164 Colo. 80 (Colo. 1967). 
32. Montague v. Montague. 510 P.2d 901 (Colo.App. 1973). 
33. Foutch v.Foutch. 469 P.2d 2333, 2 Wash. App. 407. 
(Wash.App 1970) 
34. Kelso v. Kelso. 448 P.2d 499, 75 Wash.2d, 24 (Wash. 1968). 
35. Wick v. Wick. 489 P.2d 19, 107 Ariz.382 (Ariz. 1971). 
36. Hum v. Hum. 541 P.2d 360 (Alaska 1975). 
37. Matter of Marriage of Clapperton 649 P.2d 620, 58 Or.App. 577 
(Or.App. 1982). 
38. Wanberg v. Wanberg. 664 P.2d 568 (Alaska 1983). 
39. Christiansen v. Christiansen. 667 P.2d 592 (Utah 1983). 
40. Nesmith v. Nesmith. 540 P.2d 1229, 112 Ariz. 248 (Ariz. 1975). 
41. In re Marriage of Manzo. 659 P.2d 669 (Colo. 1983). 
42. Naranjo v. Naranjo. 751 P.2d 1144 (Utah App. 1988). 
43. Ruhsam v. Ruhsam. 742 P.2d 123 (Utah App. 1987). 
44. Wiese v. Wiese. 699 P.2d 700 (Utah 1985). 
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45. Fischer v. Fischer. 443 P.2d 463, 92 Idaho 379 (Idaho 1968). 
46. Hansen v..Hansen. 537 P.2d 491 (Utah 1975). 
47. Carter v. Carter. 379 P.2d 311, 191 Kan. 
48. Despain v. Despain. 610 P.2d 1303 (Utah 1980). 
49. Dehm v. Dehm. 5545 P.2d 525 (Utah 1976) 
50. Olson v. Olson. 704 P.2d 564 (Utah 1985) 
51. Newmever v. Newmeyer. 745 P.2d 276 (Utah 1987). 
52. Jones v. Jones.. 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985). 
53. Jones v. Jones 700 P.2d 1075 (Utah 1985). 
54. Canning v. Canning. 744 P.2d 325 (Utah App. 1987). 
55. Schindler v. Schindler. 776 P.2d 84 (Utah App. 1989). 
56. Rasband v, Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988) 
57. English v. English. 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977). 
58. Tallev v. Tallev. 739 P.2d 83 (Utah App. 1987). 
59. Bushell v. Bushel!. 649 P.2d 85 (Utah 1982). 
60. Haslam v. Morrison. 113 Utah 14, 190 P.2d 520. 523 (1948). 
61 . Heltman v. Heltman. 511 P.2d 720 (Utah 1973). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. The record in this case is voluminous due in large part to the fact 
that the plaintiff did not have funds to move from her home on H Street. 
Substantial portions of the record deal with this issue and no provisions 
of funds were made to help her move. 
2. At the conclusion of what appears to be a very unorthodox and 
disjointed trial proceeding, the trial court allowed the defendant's 
attorney. Glen M. Richman, to prepare the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, as Attorneys for Plaintiff which alone should make the divorce 
invalid. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, was handed to the 
plaintiff in court, September 6, 1990, the day of the trial with no 
opportunity before-hand to read it. 
3. On October 4, 1990, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal. No Cross-
Appeal was filed. 
4. The divorce case was first appealed to The Utah Court of Appeals 
from a final Decree of Divorce of the Third Judicial District Court entered 
4 
on September 10, 1990. Case No. 900528-CA. Before Judges Orme, 
Greenwood, and Russon (Rule 31 Hearing). 
5. The Court remanded the case for reconsideration, stating: 
"However, the record contains insufficient evidence to 
support the court's finding #17 regarding costs and fees and 
the court's finding regarding defendant's pension. See Briggs v. 
Holcomb. 740 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Birch v. 
Birch. 771 P.2d 1114, 1116-17 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Accordingly, we remand for reconsideration of those issues. 
If, having decided those issues, the court determines some 
adjustment to other aspects of the property distribution is in 
order, the court has the discretion to make such adjustments." 
6. The case was remanded to the District Court of the Third Judicial 
District in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The Honorable John A. 
Rokich, Judge presiding. 
Rita C. Gum, as Plaintiff, filed an Affidavit of Prejudice, stating: 
I am the plaintiff in the above-entitled cause, and I cannot 
have a fair and impartial trial before the Honorable John A. 
Rokich, Judge of the Third District Court, before whom this 
action is now pending, for the reason that the Honorable John 
A. Rokich is biased and prejudiced against this affiant, as 
hereinafter more particularly alleged. 
7. The record shows that this matter was not handled by the court as 
required in accordance with the Utah Code. 
8. The trial court forced the plaintiff to attend court, October 17, 
1991, under threat of contempt in regards to child custody of Amy 
Charmaine Gum. Then changed the purpose of the hearing "to schedule an 
evidentiary hearing to get this matter resolved." (Tr. 1). 
9. The court preceded to improperly set a hearing which the court had 
no right, in law, to set and then proceeded with the hearing without the 
plaintiff present. The plaintiff did not appear at the November 1, 1991 
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hearing as the matter of Judge Michael R. Murphy's ruling on the prejudice 
charge was not completed. (Tr. 24). The law clearly states that the judge 
can not proceed until this procedure is completed. Judge Murphy's Order is 
dated December 3, 1991. The hearing was plainly illegal as it was held 
before the order was issued. 
10. The transcript again shows the prejudice of the Honorable John A. 
Rokich who ignored issues of the remand of The Utah Court of Appeals. 
11. Glen M. Richman, the Attorney for the defendant prepared 
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Amended Decree of 
Divorce which ignored issues of the remand of The Utah Court o1 Appeals. 
12. This second appeal is from this final Amended Decree of Divorce 
of the District Court of the Third Judicial District entered on/or about 
February 14, 1992. The Decree is clearly illegal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Marital History 
The parties were married on March 24, 1982 , in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah (p. 2, par. 2 - Record on Appeal). 
Rita was 46 years of age and James was 52 when they were married. 
During the marriage relationship, the parties have acquired 
investments which should be equitably divided (p. 3, par. 8 - Record on 
Appeal). 
Rita is the mother of two minor children who were adopted by 
defendant and are considered to be issue of the marital relationship, to 
wit: Amy Charmaine Gum (DOB 3/14/75) and Joy Charmaine Gum (DOB 
9/22/76) (p.2, par. 3 - Record on Appeal). 
On March 8, 1990, Rita filed a Complaint for divorce (pp. 2-4,- Record 
on Appeal). 
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Defendant moved out of the parties' place of residence (p. 7, par. 2 -
Record on Appeal). 
Defendant failed to provide for any expenses for plaintiff such that the 
house payment and all utilities will remain unpaid, if they are not paid by 
defendant (p. 7, par. 3.- Record on Appeal). 
Defendant took plaintiff's name off all bank accounts and has withheld 
all marital assets and money from plaintiff except her part-time 
employment at the Hilton Hotel from which she earns $300 to $400 per 
month (p. 7, par. 4 - Record on Appeal). 
Plaintiff needed the home and furnishings to care for the children and 
$540.00 per month as temporary child support (p. 7, par. 5 - Record on 
Appeal). 
Rita is a fit and proper parent who should be awarded the care, custody 
and control of the minor children subject to defendant's reasonable 
visitation (p. 3, par. 5 - Record on Appeal). 
Defendant should maintain all health, accident and life insurance 
policies preserving the currently named beneficiaries until the youngest 
child reaches age 18. (p. 3, par. 13 - Record on Appeal). 
Rita is entitled to retirement income from defendant's employment 
when she is age 60, said retirement should be ordered by the Court (p. 3, 
par. 9 - Record on Appeal). 
On March 26, 1990, James filed an Answer and Counterclaim (pp. 12 -
27 - Record on Appeal). 
ERA - Carlson & Company, Realtors, letter dated April 5, 1990: 
Rita Gum has been most cooperative in trying to get her 
home sold. She has provided a key for the front door, which is 
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in a Realtors' key box. This makes the house accessible to all 
Realtors at any time. 
Rita has kept the property in a show-able condition and 
agreed to a price reduction in order to try to get the home sold 
(p. 188 - Record on Appeal). 
In May 1990 Rita received a copy of Order on Order to Show Cause 
and Objections to Commissioner's Recommendation. ORDERS as follows: 
The plaintiff shall vacate the parties home on or before the 
20th day of May, 1990 and the defendant shall take possession 
thereof (p. 62, par. 2 - Record on Appeal). 
This order should clearly be a violation of Rita's and the minor 
children's rights under the 14th Amendment of Section 1 of the United 
States Constitution as quoted (p. 44, par. 3 - Record on Appeal). 
The home was jointly owned by Rita and James as well as the one at 
5685 South 3650 West, Bennion, Utah, (A-2), which they bought and rented 
to Jim Gum, James son. 
Commissioner Peuler was also influenced by the fact that defendant 
was living in his son's home (the son was not there). He v/as not making 
any rental or mortgage payments on the home and was thus enjoying free 
housing (p. 51, par. 8 - Record on Appeal). 
The rental agreement was and still is making the mortgage payments 
and James is still living there. 
Commissioner Peuler stated that it would be in the best interests of 
the children for plaintiff and the children to stay in the home until the 
home is sold (p. 50, par. 5 - Record on Appeal). 
The Court's ruling that plaintiff move out of the home in Twenty days is 
not reasonable due to the fact that the children are in school until June 8 
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and such a move would disrupt the children's school and social activities 
(p. 51, par. 9 - Record on Appeal). 
On the 25th day of May, 1990 Rita was deposed and during said 
deposition she put her physical and medical condition into issue. She 
made a claim for alimony in her Complaint (p. 98, par. 2 - Record on 
Appeal). 
Mr. Welker was sent a copy of the deposition notices and a letter dated 
May 30, 1990 which in part says: 
It appears it will be necessary to take the depositions of Dr. 
Keith and Dr. Maddock. (p. 99, par. 4 - Record on Appeal). 
Rita received a Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel dated 31 day of May, 
1990 -— on the grounds that he is permanently moving to California (p. 
79,- Record on Appeal). 
Earl S. Spafford and L. Charles Spafford of the firm of Spafford and 
Spafford enter their appearance as her counsel June 12, 1990 (p. 81,-
Record on Appeal). 
There after it appears that Mr. Spafford entered an appearance signed 
the 12th day of June, presented an Ex Parte Motion to a judge not assigned 
to the case for a protective order, and received an Ex Parte Protective 
Order and Stay without any notification to plaintiff's counsel, 
(p. 100, par. 6 - Record on Appeal). 
Dr. Robert K. Maddock Jr., M.D. was served Subpoena Duces Tecum on 13 
June 90 (p. 120 - Record on Appeal). 
Dr. Thomas B. Keith, M.D. was not available for service (p. 117,- Record 
on Appeal). 
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Rita through her attorney Earl S. Spafford requests of the court oral 
argument on her Motion for Stay of Proceedings and for Rehearing, June 
18, 1990 (p. 145,- Record on Appeal). 
Despite the Order requiring the plaintiff to move from the home by 
the 20th day of May, she has refused to do so and is in disobedience of the 
Court Order, and remains in said home (p. 99, par. 3 - Record on Appeal). 
Defendant moves the Court for an Order to Show Cause requiring the 
plaintiff to show cause, if any she has, why she should not be required to 
immediately vacate the parties' home as required by earlier Court Order, 
and upon her failure to do so, why she should not be held in contempt and 
punished accordingly (p. 102, par. 13 - Record on Appeal). 
Defendant desires to have the medical records for the claimed 
treatment of plaintiff which she has put in issue, unless plaintiff forever 
waives any claim to alimony (p. 102, par. 11 - Record on Appeal). 
Defendant, James R. Gum, purchased a home in 1970 with his first wife 
who is now deceased. The majority of dispute in this action appears to 
revolve around the house which was clearly premarital property of the 
defendant (p. 122, par. 1 - Record on Appeal). 
But, this house became jointly owned by the two parties when they took 
a new mortgage on it making Rita also responsible for the payments. 
Defendant has agreed that any money additions accrued to his 
retirement during the marriage of the parties should be divided equally 
between the parties (p. 123, par. 9 - Record on Appeal). 
Plaintiff is impecunious. She has no resources with which to pay the 
costs of moving and no present ability to provide substitute housing for 
the minor children of the parties. Plaintiff is 54 years of age and in 
fragile health, (p. 148, par. 6 - Record on Appeal). 
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Plaintiff made diligent inquiry in an effort to find adequate housing for 
herself and daughters without success. In this regard she has inquired as 
to public shelters and was informed that housing is available only for a 
short term basis (p. 148, par. 7 - Record on Appeal). 
To move said minor children into a shelter environment would impact 
upon their schooling, their church activity, their social relationship and 
their welfare, and would not be in their best interest (p. 148, par. 6 - 8 -
Record on Appeal) (Emphasis added). 
Plaintiff, Rita C. Gum, is to vacate the home of the parties where she 
has been residing, located at 655 H Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, within ten 
(10) days from the 11th day of July, 1990; that on or before the 21st day 
of July, 1990 (p. 167, par. 1 - Record on Appeal). 
Immediately after the date the plaintiff vacates the home, the 
defendant may occupy the home for a period of thirty (30) days for the 
purpose of getting the home ready for sale. The defendant must vacate the 
home within thirty (30) days from his occupancy and the home must be 
sold within thirty (30) days thereafter (p. 168, par. 2 - Record on Appeal). 
The depositions of Dr. Keith and Dr. Maddock may be taken, and the 
records obtained (p. 168, par. 3 - Record on Appeal). 
The difference in the refund from the two returns, that is the savings 
or additional refund received by filing joint return, is to be paid over to 
the plaintiff (p. 168, par. 4 - Record on Appeal). 
The court, having received Motion for an Order to withdraw, good cause 
appearing therefore, it is hereby ORDERED: 
Earl S, Spafford of the firm of SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD, a 
Professional Corporation, attorneys for the Plaintiff, Rita 
Gum, are to withdraw as attorney of record in the above 
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entitled matter. Dated this 30 day of July, 1990 (p. 165 -
Record on Appeal). 
Rita sold the house herself at a "give away price" of One Hundred and 
Eighteen Thousand Dollars ($118,000). She had two appraisals of over 
Two Hundred Thousand Dollars ($200,000). 
Rita filed a Supplement to Complaint and Partial Response to 
Defendant's Counter Offer, of July 25, 1990: 
My attorneys have withdrawn, and I am so depleted 
financially that I am unable to incur further attorney's 
expenses, and therefore choose to represent myself and file 
this for myself (p. 173 - Record on Appeal. 
She was also exhausted and depleted emotionally. She was willing to 
do almost anything to get the divorce over with. She was willing to let 
James be awarded the divorce. Let him have custody of the children if 
they choose. She had sold the family home herself or gave it away; let 
the court decide how to divide the money. She was agreeable in letting 
the court determine the amount of child support. She only requested "that 
the court, after full examination and consideration, resolve them as his 
sense of equity and justice dictate." 
What did the court's sense of equity and justice dictate? 
Rita was handed the Trial Brief, in court by Glen M. Richman, the 
Defendant's Attorney, with no chance to read it beforehand. 
It is headed: 
Glen M. Richman, (2757) 
RICHMAN & RICHMAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
RITA B. GUM 
Plaintiff, 
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Can Mr. Richman represent both parties legally in Utah? Isn't this a 
conflict of interest? Maybe not. But isn't it like having the fox guard the 
hen-house (p. 178 - Record on Appeal)? 
The Decree for Divorce was headed the same way, the first paragraph 
read: 
1. Defendant is hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce upon 
the grounds of irreconcilable differences, to be final upon 
entry (p. 201, par. 1. - Record on Appeal). 
This clause could be expected from the Attorney for the Defendant. 
The Trial Brief, which is headed, Attorneys for Plaintiff, is signed by 
GLEN M. RICHMAN, Attorney for Defendant (p. 182 - Record on Appeal) 
[Emphasis added] 
Judge John A. Rokich changed this paragraph (handwritten) to read: 
1. Plaintiff and Defendant are hereby awarded a mutual 
Decree of Divorce upon the grounds of irreconcilable 
differences, to be final upon entry (p. 201, par. 1. - Record on 
Appeal). 
On October 4, 1990, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal. No Cross-
Appeal was filed. 
The divorce case was first appealed to The Utah Court of Appeals from 
a final Decree of Divorce of the Third Judicial District Court entered on 
September 10, 1990. Case No. 900528-CA. Before Judges Orme, 
Greenwood, and Russon (Rule 31 Hearing). 
The Court remanded the case for reconsideration. The case was 
remanded to the District Court of the Third Judicial District in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The Honorable John A. Rokich, Judge 
presiding. 
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A final Amended Decree of Divorce of the Third Judicial District Court 
entered on/or about February 14, 1992. 
The case was then appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
on March 12, 1992 and was transferred to The Utah Court of Appeals. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This second appeal is from a final Amended Decree of Divorce of the 
Third Judicial District Court entered on/or about February 14, 1992. 
No Cross-Appeal has been filed. 
The case was first appealed from a final Decree of Divorce of the Third 
Judicial District Court entered on September 10, 1990. Case No. 900528-
CA. Before Judges Orme, Greenwood, and Russon (Rule 31 Hearing). It was 
remanded for reconsideration of certain issues which were not 
reconsidered by the trial court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I: 
Is the Amended Decree of Divorce illegal, since legal 
procedures required by the Utah Code were not followed by the 
trial court, and should it be declared null and void and 
accordingly be remanded for proper reconsideration of those 
issues set forth in the original Order of the Utah Court of 
Appeals. (A-1), 
POINT II: 
Who legally owns the house at 5685 South 3650 West, 
Bennion, Utah, which the parties bought and rented to Jim Gum, 
James son, who still rents it and resides there, as it is held on 
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a deed as joint tenants by James Richard Gum and Rita C. Gum. 
( A - 2 ) . 
POINT III: 
Did the conduct of the trial court in ignoring the Utah Code, 
as shown in the transcript, constitute added judicial bias and 
misconduct; and should the judge be replaced by the Utah Court 
of Appeals on remand of the case; so that it may be properly 
concluded. (Entire transcript). 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I: 
Is the Amended Decree of Divorce illegal, since legal 
procedures required by the Utah Code were not followed by the 
trial court, and should it be declared null and void and 
accordingly be remanded for proper reconsideration of those 
issues set forth in the original Order of the Utah Court of 
Appeals. (A-1). 
Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is very clear in the 
matter of disqualification of a judge: 
"Whenever a party to any action or proceedings, civil or 
criminal, or his attorney shall make and file an affidavit that 
the judge before whom such action or proceedings is to be 
tried or heard has a bias or prejudice, either against such 
party or his attorney or in favor of any opposite party to the 
suit, such judge shall proceed no further therein, except to call 
in another judge to hear and determine the matter. If the judge 
against whom the affidavit is directed questions the 
sufficiency of the affidavit, he shall enter an order directing 
that a copy thereof be forthwith certified to another judge 
(naming him) of the same court or of a court of like 
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jurisdiction, which judge shall then pass upon the legal 
sufficiency of the affidavit. If the judge against whom the 
affidavit is directed does not question the legal sufficiency of 
the affidavit, or if the judge to whom the affidavit is certified 
finds that it is legally sufficient, another judge must be called 
in. to try the case or determine the matter in question," 
Emphasis added. 
There was not a hearing held of the Appellant before the Honorable 
Judge Michael R. Murphy ("except to call in another judge to hear and 
determine the matter "). Judge Murphey's Order, dated December 3, 1991, 
states" 
It is therefore ordered that the matter is referred back to the 
assigned judge for resolution. (A- 3). 
This Order came to late in the case. The Honorable John A. Rokich had 
denied removal of the cause to another judge until after the hearings of 
October 17, 1991 and November 1, 1991. Therefor any order or judgment 
based on evidence taken by the judge at these hearings is ineffective 
against the Appellant. 
Effect of Affidavit. If after a party files an affidavit of bias or 
prejudice, a judge denies removal of the cause to another judge, as 
contemplated by Subdivision (b), any order or judgment based on evidence 
thereafter taken by the judge is ineffective against the affiant. Anderson 
v. Anderson, 13 Utah 2d 36, 368 P.2d 264 (1962). 
This cause came before the Honorable John A. Rokich for a second trial 
after remand by the Utah Court of Appeals for reconsideration of issues on 
an appeal by the Appellant taken from a Decree of Divorce from the above-
named Appellee. It is the rule in at least one jurisdiction that the original 
trial judge is disqualified to sit on retrial after a mistrial or reversal 
when the circumstances and conditions surrounding the litigation are of 
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such nature that they might cast doubt and question as to the fairness or 
impartially of any judgment the trial judge may pronounce, even though he 
is not conscious of any bias or prejudice. 
In Re Estate of Hupp (1955) 178 Kan 672, 291 P2d 428, the petition for 
disqualification was denied by the trial judge, the case again proceeded to 
trial, and the court again made findings of fact and conclusions of law 
substantially similar to its findings on the first trial. On appeal, the 
action of the trial judge in refusing to disqualify himself was specified as 
error. 
The court stated that the basic principal upon which the 
disqualification statute rested is the purpose of the law that no judge 
shall hear and determine a case in which he is not wholly free, 
disinterested, impartial, and independent. The corollary of this rule, held 
the court, is that when circumstances and conditions surrounding 
litigation are of such nature that they might cast doubt and question as to 
the fairness or impartiality of any judgment the trial judge may 
pronounce, such judge, even though he is not conscious of any bias or 
prejudice, should disqualify himself and permit the case to be tried before 
a judge pro tern. Remarking that it is the duty of the Supreme Court to 
maintain and safeguard the right of trial by a fair and impartial tribunal, 
and to be vigilant in seeing to it that every possible semblance of 
reasonable doubt or suspicion on that question is removed and eliminated 
to the end that justice may be properly administered, and the court 
concluded that under the composite or collective impression gained by 
careful consideration of the situation as it existed at the time of the 
judge's overruling of the petition for disqualification, it would have been 
better for all parties concerned, and conducive to the best interests of the 
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judiciary in general, if the trial judge had sustained the petition for 
disqualification, and held that it was error for him to have refused to do 
so. 
POINT II: 
Who legally owns the house at 5685 South 3650 West, 
Bennion, Utah, which the parties bought and rented to Jim Gum, 
James son, who still rents it and resides there, as it is held on 
a deed as joint tenants by James Richard Gum and Rita C. Gum. 
( A - 2 ) . 
James testified at the first trial as follows: 
Q (By Mr. Richman) Mr. Gum, when you were married to your first wife 
did you purchase a home? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q Where is that home? 
A. 635 H Street here in Salt Lake City. 
Q And whose money did you use to purchase that home? 
A. My money. 
Q And is that where the plaintiff is residing at the time? 
A. Yes. 
Q Was the house remodeled after you married this present wife, Rita 
Gum? 
A. Yes, it was. 
Q And whose money was used to remodel the house? 
A. My money. 
Q Was it from your earnings at work? 
A. Earnings, my earnings. 
Q And savings? 
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A. And savings. 
Q And was there any money at the time provided to you by Rita Gum, 
the plaintiff in this action, to remodel or purchase anything toward the 
upkeep of this house? 
A. None whatsoever. (Tr. p. 3, line 24 - 25; p. 4, line 1 - 24). 
There were three mortgages, taken in the names of the parties for 
funds to do the remodeling, causing the property to be held jointly. 
Proffer by Mr, Spafford as follows: 
Mr. Spafford: Let me make a proffer, your honor, to save a lot of 
time. 
My proffer is that she earns less than $600 a month; he earns $3,000 
month. This couple has two homes. The one is the exhibit 9-P, which is 
the home they're living in. It is owned jointly by them, and while 
admittedly it was acquired prior to the marriage, during the marriage 
from marital assets the home was remodeled. Indeed it was conveyed to 
her jointly with him, so she's has an equitable interest in the property. 
They have a second piece of property in Salt Lake County, the lot 72, 
Whitewood Estates, another home which is also deeded to the two parties 
jointly, Mr. Gum has placed, under a rental agreement, his son in the 
second piece property, and he is collecting the rent on it, (A-2). 
So effectively, your order dispossesses her of the home she's living 
in and effectively grants him the possession of both pieces of property, 
two homes [Emphasis added] 
So we have the ludicrous situation of a woman who earns a poverty 
level wage, who has no place to go. and who has a equity in two separate 
pieces of property: and the husband winds up with both pieces of property 
while she's effectively put out on the street (Tr. p. 20, 21 -25; p. 21). 
[Emphasis added] 
In re Marriage of Kittleson 585 P.2d 167, 21 Wash.App. 344 
(Wash.App. 1978). the court stated: 
In marriage dissolution action, it is trial court's duty to 
characterize property of parties as community or separate, and 
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to dispose of all property of parties which is brought to its 
attention. 
In another Washington case Lvnn v. Lynn 480 P.2d 789, 4 Wash.App. 
171 (Wash.App. 1971) the court stated: 
Although trial court is not in a divorce proceeding required 
to award all separate property to the party acquiring it or to 
divide community property equally, the court does not have 
unfetted freedom to exercise its personal judgment. RCWA 
26.08-110. 
Disposition of property is cited in Section 30-3-5, Utah Code 
Annotated. 1953, as amended. 
In a Wyoming case Kane v. Kane 577 P.2d 172 (Wyo. 1978) the court 
stated: 
In a divorce proceeding the disposition of property of the 
parties is an equitable function of the court. 
Both homes of the parties were held in joint tenancy. In the Arizona 
case of Nesmith v. Nesmith 540 P.2d 1229, 112 Ariz. 248 (Ariz. 1975). it 
is stated: 
Joint tenancy property is to be divided equally by trial court 
in divorce. A.R.S. § 25-318. 
In making a division of marital property in a divorce proceeding, the 
trial Court is governed by general principles of equity. Title 30 Chapter 3, 
Section 5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, Land v. Land. 605 P.2d 
1248. 
This writer submits that there is no semblance of equity in awarding of 
the other home to the Respondent with no part of that asset to the 
Appellant. 
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This matter was not settled in the second trial and entered in the 
Amended Decree of Divorce. Nor was the matter of other mutually owned 
assets addressed. 
POINT III: 
Did the conduct of the trial court in ignoring the Utah Code, 
as shown in the transcript, constitute added judicial bias and 
misconduct; and should the judge be replaced by the Utah Court 
of Appeals on remand of the case; so that it may be properly 
concluded. (Entire transcript). 
The transcript of the first trial begins: 
Salt Lake City, Utah; Wednesday, July 11, 1990 (3:00 P.M.) 
The Court: Do vou think we are going to finish this bv five o'clock? 
(Tr.. p. 1, lines 20 - 21). [Emphasis added]. 
Mr. Richman: Oh, sure. 
Q (By Mr. Spafford) Let me put it this way. Where would you go if 
you moved out? 
A. I don't have anyplace to go. [Emphasis added]. 
The Court: That's immaterial. [Emphasis added]. 
Mr. Spafford: It goes to the issue of contempt, your Honor. 
The court: Let's find out why she doesn't move out, not where she's 
going to go. [Emphasis added]. 
Q (By Mr. Spafford) Why haven't you moved out? 
A. I don't have anyplace to go. I don't have anv money to ao anyplace. 
(Tr. p. 20, lines 2 -13). [Emphasis added]. 
The Court: We're going to waste a lot of time here. I can sort it out. 
I told vou in the first instance I'm inclined to have her move out of the 
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house: They haven't shown me any reason why she shouldn't be out. So, I'm 
not convinced that the fact that she hasn't anv place to go is anv reason 
that I should not enforce the order. So, you know- (Tr. p. 25, lines 16 -
22). [Emphasis added]. 
Had the court not decided the issue before hearing the testimony, and 
was not willing to take the time to hear the testimony? Can a court make 
an unbiased and unprejudiced decision without weighing the testimony of 
moving a person out of their home against their rights under the 14th 
Amendment of Section 1 of the United States Constitution? 
In a similar case, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
We offer the general philosophy expressed in Haslam v. 
Morrison. 113 Utah 14, 190 P.2d 520. 523 (1948) Justice 
Wolfe, writing for the court, stated: The purity and integrity 
of the judicial process ought to be protected against any taint 
of suspicion to the end that the public and litigants may have 
the highest confidence in the integrity and fairness of the 
courts.' Justice Wade in a concurring opinion stressed this 
point when he wrote: 'One of the most important things in 
government is that all persons subject to its jurisdiction shall 
always be able to maintain a fair and impartial trial in all 
matters of litigation in the courts. It is nearly as important 
that the people have absolute confidence in the integrity of the 
courts. I can think of nothing that would as surely bring the 
courts into disrepute as for a judge to insist on trying a case 
when one of the litigants believes that such judge is biased 
and prejudiced against him'." Marchant v. Marchant 743 P.2d 
199 (Utah App. 1987)x 
The same pattern of contempt was followed in the second trial as is 
shown by the transcript. 
It is respectfully urged that the foregoing conduct constitutes judicial 
bias and an error in law and should not be condoned by this Court. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in awarding the Decree of Divorce. The Amended 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Amended Decree of 
Divorce, should be declared null and void. 
That the case should be remanded to the trial court before a new judge; 
with a similar Order to the previous one, only more clearly setting out the 
ruling of the Court of Appeals 
The Appellant should have the opportunity to be awarded a fair and 
equitable division of all marital property in a new trial with a fair judge 
who will abide the law. 
Attorney's fees should be considered by the trial court. Considering the 
ability of Appellant to pay those fees and the cost of two appeals. Rita's 
disposable income is far less than James' as well as being less stable. 
In addition, she should have the opportunity to be awarded her interest 
in all mutual property, including the house in Bennion, and the Appellee's 
retirement program. 
Appellant respectfully requests that the relief requested be granted. 
Respectfully submitted this 16th day of November, 1992. 
RitaC. Gum 
Attorney Pro Se for the Appellant 
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ORDER 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Rita C. Gum, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
James Richard Gum, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
^Mary T. NooriMn 
Clerk of th« Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Case No. 900528-CA 
Before Judges Orme, Greenwood, and Russon (Rule 31 Hearing). 
Based on the evidence in the record and, in particular, 
plaintiff's concessions as set forth in the document she filed 
with the court styled by her a supplemental complaint, we 
affirm the trial court's findings and conclusions regarding 
alimony, child support, the grounds for granting the divorce, 
and the real property and sale proceeds. 
See Briqqs 
Birch v. 
However, the record contains insufficient evidence to 
support the court's finding #17 regarding costs and fees and 
the court's finding regarding defendant's pension. 
v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); 
Birch, 771 P.2d 1114, 1116-17 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Accordingly, we remand for reconsideration of those issues. 
If, having decided those issues, the court determines some 
adjustment to other aspects of the property distribution is in 
order, the court has the discretion to make such adjustments. 
Dated this 23rd day of May, 1991. 
ALL CONCUR: 
Gregor^K. Orme, Judge 
Pamela T. Gr 
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8 WARRANTY DEED 
£> VAL R. COYERSTONE and TERESE D. C0VERST0NE grantor 
~ of SALT LAKE CITY , County of SALT LAKE , Stata of Utah, hereby 
CONVEY and WARRANT to 
JAMES R. GUM and RITA C. GUM, husband and wi fe , as j o i n t tenants 
grantee 
of Salt Lake City , County of Sa l t Lake, State of Utah tor tha sum of 
TEN AND NO/100 and other good and valuable considerat ions -DOLLARS, 
tha following described tract of land In SALT LAKE County, 
State of Utah: 
Lot 72, WHITEWOOO ESTATES NO. 2 , according to the o f f i c i a l p la t thereof , recorded 
In Book 79-2 of Plats tit Page 48, records of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
Subject to a Trust Oeed 1n favor of Western Mortgage Loan Corporation dated 
September 4th, 1986 in the o r i g i n a l principal amount of $69,857.00 which Trust 
Oeed the grantees herein cssume and agree to pay. 
The grantors herein ass ign to the grantees herein a l l of the ir r i g h t , t i t l e < j > 
and In teres t 1n and to the tax and Insurance re serves . >s. 
4515003 
28 AUGUST 87 04152 Pfl 
K A T I E L . D I X O N 
RECORDER* SALT LAKE C0UHTY> UTAH 
GUARDIAN TITLE 
REC BY I REBECCA GRAY » DEPUTY 
Subject to current general t a x e s , easements and r e s t r i c t i o n s . 
Ai 
ITNE88, the hand of aald grantor , thla X *G ±-
 Qty 0f 
ugust , A. D. 19 87 
Slgnad In tha Preaanca of 
VAL R. C O Y E R S T O N E 7 
TERESE D. COVERSTOME 
STATE OF WOW, TEXAS 
County of £L fa* 
On tha AC dajrof August , A. D. ltf? 
paraonaJly appaarad bafora ma VAL R. C0VERST0NE 
tha ilfntr of tha within inttrumant, who duly acknowladfad to ma U N U M tht • ^ » 
toj.'!** 
-TVf'ffi Public. 
Mr opproiialcQ.txplrH (QJLJXl , JUatdlng I n . . 
aiANM f l«t—W>WU*TT a w O OKM PftlNTINO CO — t*t? CAM trrv 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RITA C. GUM, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES RICHARD GUM, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
CIVIL NO. 904901065 
This matter was referred by the assigned judge under Rule 
63(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to the presiding judge. 
The latter has reviewed the file, and determines that the 
affidavit of bias and prejudice is legally insufficient and 
specifically notes that neither a transcript nor references to 
specific pages of a transcript were provided in support of the 
affidavit• 
It is therefore ordered that the matter is referred back to 
the assigned judge for resolution. 
Dated this ^ day of December, 1991. 
/$/ ^pii^J} £ 
MICHAEL R. MURPHY 
PRESIDING JUDGE 
s\ 
GUM V. GUM PAGE TWO ORDER 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Order, to the following, this j day of 
December, 1991: 
Rita C. Gum 
Pro se 
1034 East 900 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
Glen M. Richman 
Attorney for Defendant 
60 South 600 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
C ^i/cr& AA-AJ£=Z 
